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Abstract 
The position of enterprises, industries and economies on the market 
depends on their response to a wide range of incentives, market trends, 
technological changes, government policies and institutional reforms. The 
adjustments made by companies so as to take over their rivals’ market are 
commonly referred to as restructuring. It is important to understand 
enterprise restructuring since the ability of enterprises to compete 
determines the ability of their nations to grow and to provide better 
standard of living. Over past two decades enterprise restructuring has 
been prominent feature of firm behaviour in Central and East European 
countries. Institutional reforms in these countries have required 
enterprises to introduce changes in their behaviour in order to survive. 
Bearing this in mind, this paper looks into forms, objectives of and 
reasons for enterprise restructuring in transition. It also identifies major 
patterns of enterprise restructuring and discusses which factors and 
forces have motivated firms to choose particular pattern of restructuring. 
Finally, paper provides review of methodological issues pertinent to 
existing analyses of this process.  
Keywords: enterprise restructuring, transition, institutions, Central and 
East European countries 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The position of enterprises, industries and economies on the market 
depends on their response to a wide range of incentives, market trends, 
technological changes, government policies and institutional reforms. By making 
adjustments to their behaviour, economic units (agents) can secure their survival 
and seize their rivals’ market. These adjustments, which are commonly referred 
to as restructuring, can take various forms ranging from changes in relative size 
of different sectors within an economy to the creation of new industrial networks, 
changes in the input mix, output basket and the technology of production, and 
financial and operational changes in the behaviour of enterprises. Forms and 
determinants of restructuring at enterprise level are particularly important as the 
key to overall national competitiveness lies in the ability of enterprises to 
compete. This ability, in turn, is closely linked to the restructuring efforts of 
firms.  
Over past two decades enterprise restructuring was prominent feature of 
firm behaviour in Central and East European countries (CEECs). It was one of 
most important mechanisms of the successful transformation of former socialist 
countries into market-oriented economies. The changing environment 
characterised by institutional reforms, the rise of new and the decline of old 
sectors, the release of previously suppressed demand partially met by the large 
scale entry of foreign firms, the break-up of traditional enterprise networks 
(particularly including those in other socialist countries), and increasing 
competition required enterprises to make adjustments in their behaviour in order 
to survive under the new conditions.  
The objective of this paper is to explore determinants, forms and 
outcomes of enterprise restructuring in the period of transition. To this end, paper 
poses question of what enterprise restructuring means. It also discusses its 
objectives and forms as well as the major reasons for enterprise restructuring in 
transition. The paper identifies major patterns of enterprise restructuring in 
transition conditions and explores what factors and forces have motivated 
enterprises to choose particular patterns of restructuring. Finally, the paper 
provides an overview of methodological issues pertinent to existing analyses of 
enterprise restructuring in transition and discusses their implications for 
understanding of nature of this process.  
The paper is structured as follows. Next section explains the basic 
concepts of restructuring at economy, industry and enterprise levels. Main 
features of firm behaviour in former centrally-planned economies and major 
changes in socio-economic framework of these economies that acted as impulse 
for enterprise restructuring are discussed in section 3. Section 4 identifies the 
major patterns of enterprise restructuring, their determinants and outcomes. Also, 
it discusses methodologies used in existing studies on enterprise restructuring in 
transition. By doing this it highlights the shortcomings and gaps in the present 
state of knowledge. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
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2.  WHAT IS ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING? 
 
2.1.  Basic concepts 
Enterprise restructuring is the process through which an enterprise 
adjusts its behaviour to changes in its circumstances arising from actions of 
rivals, changes in market conditions, technological changes, institutional reforms 
or economic policies. These changes provide the enterprises with an opportunity 
to change their operations in order to expand their market share (often at the 
expense of their rivals). Enterprises which do not react to changes in their 
circumstances will ultimately suffer the consequence and may be driven out of 
the market. However, the competitiveness of nations and industries rests on the 
back of their enterprises - whose ability to compete in turn depends on their 
behaviour. From here it follows that enterprise restructuring holds the key to 
competitiveness of enterprises, industries and national economies (Lieberman, 
1990; Mathieu, 1996; Hare, 2003).  
Enterprise restructuring is part of the wider concept of economic 
restructuring which also includes changes in the relative size of different sectors 
of the national economy, development of new forms of inter-enterprise networks 
and changes in the structure of production at the level of industry (Kuznets, 1957; 
Chenery, 1960; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Hare, 2003). In this context, 
enterprise restructuring is a response to incentives created by the economy-wide 
or industry-side restructuring. Systemic changes, institutional reforms, changes in 
demand, technology or the availability of new resources pave the way for changes 
in relative size of sectors within an economy which in turn motivates enterprises 
to adjust their behaviour and take advantage of the new circumstances – or ignore 
the new conditions and face the consequences. This adjustment is facilitated 
through the creation of industrial networks, acquisitions or foreign direct 
investment as well as through cooperation with research centres and training 
institutes (Mathieu, 1996; Radosevic and Sadowski, 2004). 
Irrespective of the reason for changed circumstances, restructuring takes 
place within individual enterprises through adjustments in both financial and 
operational dimensions. Financial restructuring encompasses activities such as 
rescheduling, write-off or swapping of debt for equity and its objective is to 
restore and improve solvency and financial stability of the enterprise (Claessens, 
2005). In this context, financial forms of enterprise restructuring are 
complemented by operational restructuring which takes place through 
improvements in the efficiency of production, adjustments of managerial 
incentives, organisational changes as well as improvements in the quality of 
existing products and changes in product mix (Carlin et al., 1994; Grosfeld and 
Roland, 1996; Djankov and Murrell, 2002). By developing new and better ways 
of combining knowledge and resources, enterprises can defend themselves 
against the threat of bankruptcy and expand their market share. Hence, enterprise 
restructuring can be understood as a process whose objective is to secure the 
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survival of an enterprise in a changing environment and to increase its cash value, 
profitability and market share (Pohl et al., 1997).  
 
2.2.  Patterns of enterprise restructuring 
Enterprise restructuring is commonly divided into either defensive or 
strategic restructuring (Carlin et al., 1994; Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). In the 
terminology of Grosfeld and Roland (1996), defensive restructuring takes place 
within existing capacities of enterprise through scaling down of activities such as 
closing, selling or leasing of unprofitable units or shedding excessive labour. 
However, it does not include activities such as the development of new products 
or product lines or the improvements in technology of production which are often 
identified as factors and forces that enable an enterprise to outperform its rivals in 
dynamic imperfect competition. As scaling down of enterprise activities cannot 
last indefinitely and enterprise will eventually face closure, defensive 
restructuring may be labelled as a pattern of restructuring that secures the survival 
of an enterprise in the short run.    
Strategic restructuring, on the other hand, is a pattern of enterprise 
behaviour which creates foundations for sustainable development of enterprises 
in the long run. It involves active and radical reorganisation of enterprise’s 
activities, improvements in the efficiency of production through investment in 
new equipment, introduction of innovations in production process and creation of 
incentives which will increase the productivity of labour. It also implies changes 
in the structure of products through improvements in quality of existing products 
and development of new ones. It is embarked upon by enterprises which 
recognise the irreversibility of the systemic change and undertake adjustments in 
their operations in order to outperform their rivals in the long run (Grosfeld and 
Roland, 1996).  
It should be emphasised that strategic and defensive restructuring are not 
independent or mutually exclusive concepts. Some enterprises embark on 
defensive restructuring first, because of insufficient resources or incentives, and 
engage in strategic restructuring later when, for example, new and insightful 
owners take over the company and obtain sufficient resources for investment. As 
the behaviour of enterprise in any period can be understood in terms of the 
outcome of its past decision and their consequences, any mistakes made during 
defensive restructuring will act as impediment to strategic restructuring (Brada, 
1998). Enterprises which fail to react proactively to changed circumstances will 
lose some of their market to rivals with severe consequences for their financial 
performance and their value. This would in turn, reduce their attractiveness to 
new owners of capital, skilled managers and qualified workers, thus making the 
pursuit of strategic restructuring more difficult for themselves (Grosfeld and 
Roland, 1996).   
Summing up the findings from this section, we can better understand the 
nature of enterprise restructuring and its relevance for competitiveness of 
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enterprises, industries and economies. Enterprise restructuring describes the 
process of adjustment of enterprises to various changes in their environment. It 
has two main objectives: to enable enterprises to defend themselves against 
developments that threaten their survival, and to help them outperform their 
rivals. As national competitiveness is ultimately linked to the ability of 
enterprises to compete, enterprise restructuring can be identified as a process that 
holds the key to competitiveness of enterprises, industries and economies.   
 
 
3.  REASONS FOR ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING IN 
TRANSITION 
 
The behaviour of enterprises in centrally-planned economies had little in 
common with the behaviour of their counterparts in market economies. The two 
groups responded to different kind of incentives, had different scope of activities 
and pursued different objectives. Their differences were embedded in features of 
their economic systems. When these features changed in former socialist 
countries, enterprises had to adopt new principles of behaviour and reorganise 
their activities in a way which would make them capable of surviving in a market 
environment. It therefore follows that two sets of factors influenced enterprise 
restructuring in transition: the behaviour of enterprises in centrally-planned 
economies and the systemic change in these countries (Lavigne, 1999; Djankov 
and Murrell, 2002).   
 
3.1  Enterprise behaviour in centrally-planned economies  
In western industrialised economies, economic activity is coordinated 
through market mechanism. The key role in the functioning of this mechanism 
belongs to prices which convey to owners of means of production information 
about opportunities for employment of their resources and about preferences of 
buyers. Based on this information, enterprises autonomously make decisions 
about various aspects of their behaviour from the choice of suppliers to 
production methods and the product mix. In former centrally-planned economies, 
the coordinating role was delegated to the administration (or a central planning 
office) which substituted the price system and covered all aspects of economic 
life through a network of bureaucratic plans.1 This also included the behaviour of 
enterprises from their objectives to their internal organisation and their contacts 
with both domestic and foreign suppliers and customers. Hence, the running of 
socialist enterprises required more technical skills than just managerial 
competencies. In practice the functioning of socialist enterprises was flawed and 
                                                 
1 The features of centrally-planned economies have been exhaustively analysed in the literature and 
their detailed discussion would go beyond this paper. Instead, here we present only few stylised facts. 
For detailed discussion interested reader should consult Kornai (1992), Gros and Steinherr (1995) or 
Lavigne (1999). 
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consequently beset with difficulties amongst which low efficiency, lack of 
incentives for innovation and of financial discipline were the most obvious.  
The growth strategy of nearly all centrally-planned economies was based 
on the concept of rapid industrialisation2. The main tools for pursuit of this 
strategy were the central control of prices and international trade. In general, the 
system used the combination of subsidies and taxes to keep prices of strategically 
important goods, primarily inputs in basic industries low while many other goods, 
primarily consumer goods, were overpriced (Kornai, 1992). Through the same 
mechanism exchange rates were fixed (and subsidised) to facilitate the import of 
strategically important goods such as raw material and intermediate goods and to 
increase the export of goods for final use abroad (Lavigne, 1999). The 
consequences of such practice were shortages which created sellers’ markets in 
these economies and lowered the efficiency of their enterprises. 
On the one hand, shortages in supply of inputs generated disruptions in 
production. To ensure continuity of production managers had to build up stocks 
of inputs and to hire more workers than needed (Knell and Rider, 1992). On the 
other hand, the seller’s market enabled enterprises to exhaust (and even go 
beyond) economies of scale without the need to introduce new technologies or to 
economize on inputs. In addition, the lack of demand-induced incentives in 
combination with the absence of private ownership meant that enterprises did not 
need to innovate. In market economies, the rights to use assets, to appropriate 
returns on them and to bear the consequences of the changes in the value of those 
assets, motivate individuals to introduce new products, new modes of production 
or to develop new channels of communication with their buyers and suppliers. 
Such incentives were absent in centrally-planned economies as the means of 
production were the property of the state and state ownership was not a clearly 
defined concept. Hence, it was not clear who should be responsible for 
maintaining capital (Gros and Steinherr, 2004). For these reasons, compared to 
their counterparts in market economies, the intensity of energy and intermediate 
goods use per unit of output was several times higher among enterprises in 
centrally-planned economies (Knell and Rider, 1992; Gros and Steinherr, 1995).   
The low efficiency of socialist enterprises was further entrenched by 
their involvement in economic and social activities and by the presence of soft-
budget constraints. In market economies the activities of enterprises are confined 
in majority of cases to their core activity. However, in centrally-planned 
economies enterprises were required to handle many non-core activities such as 
political, administrative and social services (Lavigne, 1999). Such practices 
presented additional burden for their cost structure but it also distracted managers 
from their core activities. Another source of inefficiency was the existence of 
soft-budget constraints. In principle, the formal obligation for the repayment of 
                                                 
2 This concept implies development of economy in concentric circles where initially all resources are 
concentrated in development of basic industries so that they can later serve as the basis for the 
development of more sophisticated industries. 
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loans existed but in hierarchy of enterprise’s objectives, it was less important than 
the quantitative plan targets and fulfilment of social welfare activities. Liquidity 
problems were solved through administrative refinancing by banks. When 
enterprises were unable to meet their loan repayment requirement, banks would 
roll over and prolong the defaulted loans. Such soft budgetary constraints resulted 
in poor financial discipline, contributing to further inefficiency and loss-making 
operation of enterprises.  
Bringing all these features together, it can be seen that enterprises in 
centrally-planned economies had different objectives than their counterparts in 
market economies and running them required more technical and political rather 
than entrepreneurial skills. They lacked the knowledge of activities and skills 
which are needed for survival in a market environment. The inherent 
characteristics of centrally-planned economies had negative effects on the 
efficiency of enterprises and left them without the need for, and the incentive to 
innovate.  
 
3.2  Institutional reforms in transition 
In the course of transition many institutions of centrally-planned 
economies were modified or replaced with those more typical for market 
economies. In economic terms, the most important reforms took place in fields of 
prices, foreign trade, property rights and the financial sector (Lavigne, 1999). 
They were undertaken with the expectation that the new environment will 
motivate enterprises to restructure and eliminate the problems inherited from the 
socialist period. The removal of subsidies, the pressure of previously unsatisfied 
demand, intensified foreign competition and easier access to new technology 
were expected to induce adjustments in the input and product mix and improve 
the efficiency of enterprises while the new private property rights were expected 
to create competition, facilitate innovativeness and signal the irreversibility of 
changes (Aghion et al., 1994; De Melo et al., 1996; Megginson and Netter, 2001; 
Mickiewicz, 2005). On the financial side, the banking sector reform was expected 
to increase financial discipline of enterprises through the introduction of hard 
budget constraint (Borish et al., 1996). In addition, non-banking financial 
institutions such as stock-exchanges or investment funds were recognised as 
important mechanisms facilitating the transfer of property rights from the state to 
the private sector (Druzic, 2006). 
The speed, content and timing of the introduction of above mentioned 
reforms varied among transition economies due to their specific political and 
social circumstances.  The progress of transition economies in pursuit of the 
above reforms has been traced by the EBRD in Transition Reports (EBRD, 
various years) using a progress in transition index ranging from 1 to 4 with the 
higher values indicating the adoption of standards typical of market economies. 
Following the EBRD, and for the sake of simplicity, the European transition 
countries are grouped into the three main groups of Central and East European 
Countries, including the Baltics (CEECs), South East European Countries 
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(SEECs) and East European and Caucasus countries3 and their progress in 
different areas of reform are discussed below. 
 
 
Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2011 
Figure 1: Progress in price liberalisation, 1989-2010 
 
As Figure 1 shows, all transition countries abandoned administrative 
prices in early stage of transition. In some countries such as the Czech Republic 
and Poland prices were liberalized at the very start of transition in almost all 
sectors, except the energy sector, while in others prices were liberalised gradually 





                                                 
3 The first group includes transition economies that joined EU in 2004 and Croatia; the second group 
includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and 
Serbia; and the third group includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 




Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2011 
Figure 2: Progress in external trade liberalization, 1989-2010 
 
In most of transition countries external trade liberalisation took place 
more slowly than price liberalisation as tariffs were recognised by governments 
as a valuable source of revenues for financing of reforms. There was also fear that 
without some protection, domestic producers would be eliminated from market 
by their foreign rivals even before they had a chance to engage in restructuring. 
As we can see from Figure 2, the process of trade liberalisation was fastest in 
CEECs. Due to the obligations undertaken in the process of EU accession, all 
quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade were moved and full current 
account convertibility introduced in the early stage of transition in these countries 
(Gros and Steinherr, 2004). But even by 2000, only few transition economies had 
introduced capital account convertibility (EU candidates being these few 
countries). 




Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2011 
Figure 3: Progress in small privatisation, 1989-2010 
 
Property rights reforms in transition countries took place through two 
main channels: development of de novo private sector and privatisation of former 
state-owned enterprises. It was recognised from the beginning that the 
development of new private sector would be a lengthy process and, therefore, the 
emphasis had to be placed on the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Most 
studies distinguish between small privatisation and large-scale privatisation. The 
former expression describes development of small entrepreneurship through 
either sales or renting of assets to small private persons in previously 
underdeveloped or undeveloped sectors such as services, trade or construction. As 
Figure 3 shows, small privatisation took place in the three groups of countries 
with different intensity. CEECs went furthest in this process but by 2010 neither 
group had reached levels of small entrepreneurship in the economy close to that 
of advanced market economies.  
The privatization of large state-owned enterprises took place over a 
longer time and through several methods ranging from sale to foreign or domestic 
buyers to mass privatization schemes which consisted of often free transfer of 
shares to citizens through vouchers, either with or without the involvement of 
investment funds (Lavigne, 1999). These reforms went furthest and fastest in 
CEECs although, as Figure 4 shows, none of three groups have succeeded in 
reaching the level of advanced market economies.4 The level of private property 
                                                 
4 EBRD (2010) defines these standards as structure with more than 75% of privately owned 
enterprises and effective corporate governance.  
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rights reached in countries of Eastern Europe and Caucasus is particularly low 




Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2011 
Figure 4: Progress in large-scale privatisation, 1989-2010 
 
The financial sector in transition economies was reformed through the 
creation of a two-tier banking sector and through the development of non-banking 
financial institutions. As Figure 5 shows, the banking sector reform started 
earliest in CEECs -  indeed, in some countries such as Hungary and Poland some 
reforms had been implemented even before the beginning of transition (Lavigne, 
1999). By the advanced stage of transition these countries made significant 
progress towards the standards of banking laws and regulations typical for 
advanced industrialised economies.5 In the other two groups the reform of 
banking sector took place at a much slower pace and although  by 2010 these 
countries had achieved substantial progress in solvency of banking sector, opened 
market to private banks and liberalised interest rates , they had made little or no 
progress in other areas of the banking sector reforms (EBRD, 2010). 
                                                 
5 EBRD (2010) defines these standards as existence of well-functioning banking competition under 
effective supervision, development of term lending to private enterprises and financial deepening. 




Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2011 
Figure 5: Progress in banking sector reform, 1989-2010 
 
In the non-banking segment of financial sector, reforms took place 
through the establishment of stock-exchanges, investment funds, insurance 
markets and pension funds. In nearly all transition countries the establishment of 
stock-exchanges was among the first measures introduced. They served primarily 
as a way of familiarizing citizens of transition economies with the principles of 
capital market and they were also expected to facilitate large-scale privatisation 
(Lavigne, 1999). The ability of investment funds to restructure state-owned 
companies in the early stages of privatisation was limited as they did not have the 
necessary skills and expertise and were not well prepared for efficient monitoring 
of the companies in their portfolio. They also did not have access to finance 
which was needed for effective restructuring and in some countries they were not 
allowed to participate in the mass privatisation programme (Albania) or were 
allowed to participate only in last round of privatization which included mostly 
loss-making companies with poor prospects for survival (Hashi and Xhillari, 
1999; Mickiewicz, 2005; Druzic, 2006).  
The development of other non-banking financial institutions was slower. 
State owned insurance companies retained their privileged position for most of 
the transition period while pension funds did not emerge until the second part of 
1990s (Lavigne, 1999). Figure 2.6 reflects these developments. As in other fields 
of reform, the most notable progress was recorded in CEECs where the regulatory 
framework for the functioning of capital market was established early on, 
facilitating the emergence of non-bank financial institutions. However, in the 
other two groups of countries, the development of capital market and other non-
bank institutions is still in rudimentary form. 




Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2011 
Figure 6: Progress in securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 
reforms, 1989-2010 
 
Bringing all of these findings together we can see that the main reforms, 
which were necessary to transform the former centrally-planned economies into 
market economies, were initiated relatively early in transition and by the 
advanced stage of transition they were completed in majority of cases. This is 
particularly true for group of advanced transition economies (CEECs). As a result 
of these reforms, enterprises were forced to change their behaviour, redefine their 
objectives in line with the new market economy conditions, respond to the 
pressure of competition,  and actively embark on measures which would improve 
their efficiency and enable them to increase their market share (in other words, 
restructuring measures).  
 
3.3.  Changes in economic structure of transition economies 
Institutional reforms are not the only channel through which enterprise 
restructuring can be motivated. Incentives may also come from changes in 
technological capabilities and in the structure of demand which may also induce a 
faster growth of particular sectors at the expense of others, and create the 
incentive for inter-sectoral reallocation of resources and adjustments in their 
product mix and production efficiency. The centrally-planned economies were 
characterised by their low responsiveness to the above changes (Mickiewicz, 
2005). This was particularly evident in the last two decades of their existence 
when they retained their reliance on heavy industries and concentrated on 
improving existing technologies while most market economies shifted from the 
heavy and resource intensive to more sophisticated and less resource intensive 
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industries such as power engineering, computers and synthetic materials which 
required changes in the technological framework (Druzic, 2006). As we showed 
in the previous section, price and trade liberalisation have released previously 
suppressed and unsatisfied demand and provided better access to the new 
technologies. In this context, it would be expected that, over time, the economic 
structure of transition countries will converge to the economic structure of mature 
market economies. Figure 7 shows the process of structural convergence between 




Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank data 2008 
Figure 7: The convergence of economic structure between transition countries 
and EU15, 1990-2007 
 
The vertical axis on the diagram shows the index of structural similarity, 
developed by Thiessen and Gregory (2007), which is calculated as:  
                  (1) 
Where STEi stands for share of sector i in transition economy and SEU15i 
for the average share of sector i in EU15. Lower values of the index indicate 
structural convergence between two economic entities. Our findings indicate that 
at the beginning of transition, in terms of their economic structure, CEECs were 
much closer to EU15 countries than the other two groups. It is also evident that 
the process of structural convergence took place with different intensities in the 
three groups of transition economies. The largest change took place in CEECs 
whose economic structures became similar to the EU15 economies already by 
2000. The process of convergence in SEECs was slower and their structures did 
not become similar to those of EU15 until the late stage of transition. Finally, 
least structural convergence has taken place in the group of East European and 
Caucasus countries which is particularly true for the period after 1998 when, as 
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Figure 7 indicates, there was little variation in value of structural convergence 
index.    
All in all, our previous discussion shows that the institutional and 
systemic characteristics of centrally-planned economies had generated distinctive 
patterns of enterprise behaviour which had little in common with the behaviour of 
enterprises in market economies. Furthermore, the incentive system affecting 
these enterprises had generated numerous problems for them of which particular 
emphasis should be placed on the problem of efficiency. The replacement of 
socialist economic system and institutions with those of market economies 
required enterprises to rethink their objectives and to make adjustments in their 
organisational, financial and operational practices which would ensure their 
viability under the pressure of competition. The need for restructuring was further 
emphasised by changes in the structure of demand which required them to adjust 
their product mix. Hence, institutional reforms and economy-wide restructuring 
created an environment in which enterprises could not survive without changing 
their behaviour.  
 
 
4.  ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING IN TRANSITION 
 
During the transition period, enterprises have adjusted numerous aspects 
of their behaviour from organisational structure to the input and output mix, 
technology and their relationships with suppliers and customers. The main 
determinants, forms and outcomes of these changes have been extensively 
documented in the literature. The general message from this literature is that 
enterprises in transition have responded to changes in their environment with both 
defensive and strategic forms of restructuring. In most studies the authors have 
identified change of ownership, competition, ease of access to finance and the 
role of managers as factors that can facilitate the adjustment of enterprises to the 
new environment. The outcomes of restructuring have been manifested in 
performance of enterprises and in their competitiveness (Grosfeld and Roland, 
1996; Djankov and Murrell, 2002). In this section, we will focus our attention on 
four aspects: i) measurement of enterprise restructuring, ii) determinants of this 
process, iii) methodological approaches to enterprise restructuring and iv) the 
shortcomings and gaps in the previous research.  
 
4.1.  Measurement of enterprise restructuring 
The measurement of restructuring in transition literature takes two main 
forms. In some studies, the authors have focused on activities undertaken by 
enterprises to survive in new environment and investigated what factors influence 
these activities or how these activities affect the performance or competitiveness 
of enterprises in the short and long run. In other studies the authors have 
investigated the outcomes of restructuring in context of its determinants (Grosfeld 
and Roland, 1996; Commander et al., 1999; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; 
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Domadenik et al., 2008). There are also studies that attempt to establish a 
relationship between forms of enterprise restructuring and its outcomes (Benacek 
et al., 1997; Halpern and Korosi, 2001; Carlin et al., 2004). In the rest of this 
section we will review the two approaches to measuring restructuring and then 
review the findings on the relationship between forms and outcomes of enterprise 
restructuring.  
Studies focusing on forms of restructuring usually distinguish between 
defensive and strategic restructuring. The most commonly investigated forms of 
defensive restructuring include downsizing of employment and output which are 
perceived as attempts by enterprises to minimise losses caused by declining 
demand for their products (Estrin and Richet, 1993; Aghion et al., 1994; Grosfeld 
and Roland, 1996; Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Domadenik et al., 2008). 
Following the same reasoning, several studies have investigated defensive 
restructuring through the ability of firms to reduce their costs (Pinto et al., 1993; 
Vehovec, 2003). The most commonly used measure of costs is the labour costs, 
although in some studies authors have also investigated the ability of enterprises 
to reduce the costs of material, energy and other inputs (Pinto et al., 1993). 
Finally, several studies have considered the sale of unprofitable units, inventories 
and other enterprise assets as the indicators of attempts by enterprises to reduce 
their costs and survive in the new environment (Estrin and Richet, 1993; 
Djankov, 1999).  
On the strategic side of restructuring, studies have focused on 
adjustments undertaken by enterprises such as the replacement of obsolete 
capital, changes in their organisational and management structures, changes in 
methods of production, engagement in innovation activities aimed at improving 
their efficiency. In this context, investment in machinery and equipment has been 
one of the most commonly employed indicators of strategic restructuring (Charap 
and Zemplinerova, 1993; Grosfeld and Roland, 1996; Lizal, 1999; Coricelli and 
Djankov, 2001; Domadenik et al., 2008). Most authors have approached 
efficiency of enterprises through labour productivity (Djankov, 1999; Linz, 2000; 
Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Dimova, 2003) although some studies have used 
changes in total factor productivity as the indicator of strategic restructuring 
(Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006). A different 
approach was taken by Benacek et al. (1997) who distinguish between allocative 
efficiency (the ability of enterprises to produce with the optimal mix of inputs) 
and their technological efficiency. Finally, innovation activities have also been 
used as indicators of strategic restructuring by some authors using expenditure on 
R&D or the percentage of sales originating from new products as measures of 
innovation activity (Carlin et al., 2004; Masso and Vahter, 2007; Domadenik et 
al., 2008).  
Recognising the long history of loss-making in former socialist 
enterprises most of authors have taken profitability as an indicator of 
restructuring efforts (Benacek et al., 1997; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Bakanova 
et al., 2006). Some authors have, however, argued that restructuring efforts of 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXI. (2012.) BR. 2. (429-456)     Stojčić, N.: PATTERNS AND DETERMINANTS... 
 
445 
enterprises are better reflected in their ability to generate revenues particularly 
considering the poor accounting system in the early phase of transition and the 
ability of enterprises to show profit in their financial statements. As Frydman et 
al. (1997) put it, in the short run, measures of profitability can be affected by 
accounting methods and as such bear limited information on the actual 
performance of enterprise. Furthermore, the ability of enterprises to create 
revenues reflects their orientation towards the new entrepreneurial environment. 
For this reason, several studies have also evaluated enterprise restructuring by 
using revenues or the growth of revenues as the indicator of successful 
restructuring (Frydman et al., 1997; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Carlin et al., 
2004; Commander and Svejnar, 2007).  
The link between forms of restructuring and enterprise performance or 
competitiveness has been confirmed in several studies. Improvements in 
allocative or technical efficiency have a positive effect on profitability of 
enterprises (Benacek et al., 1997). Furthermore, growth of sales was higher in 
those enterprises that engaged in the development of new products or opened a 
new plant (Carlin et al., 2004). Similarly, Dimova (2003) finds that an increase in 
employment contributes to labour productivity of enterprises while Halpern and 
Korosi (2001) have found a positive relationship between improvements in 
efficiency of enterprise and its market share. Finally, Masso and Vahter (2007) 
have found that productivity tends to be higher in enterprises which have 
undertaken some process innovations. When taken together, these studies provide 
strong evidence that strategic restructuring enables enterprises to perform better, 
even outperform their rivals and expand their market shares. 
 
4.2.  Determinants of enterprise restructuring 
The transition literature has identified the main factors which facilitate 
the restructuring of enterprises: the institutional framework, the type of ownership 
and dominant owners, the ease of access to capital, competition, networking and 
role of managers and employees (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Starting with 
institutional reforms, the early transition literature hypothesised that institutional 
changes would be sufficient incentive for enterprises to engage in restructuring 
(Carlin et al., 1994). However, several case studies from this and later periods 
have challenged this view suggesting that additional incentives and pressures may 
be needed to motivate enterprises to restructure (Pinto et al., 1993; Lizal, 1999; 
Commander and Svejnar, 2007).  
Another argument originating in the early transition literature revolved 
around the role of managers and the power of workers in the decision making 
process as determinants of enterprise restructuring. Several theoretical models 
postulated that managers may be motivated to engage in restructuring with a 
combination of positive and negative incentives such as the desire to signal their 
skills to the managerial labour market (career concerns), the opportunity to gain a 
stake in the ownership of company after restructuring, as well as government-
driven incentives such as hardening of budget constraint, the introduction of 
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bankruptcy laws and clear definition of property rights (Estrin and Richet, 1993; 
Aghion et al., 1994; Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). Similarly, it has been argued 
that the main opposition to restructuring can come from biggest losers in the 
process, i.e. workers who fear job losses which may arise during restructuring 
(Aghion et al., 1993). However, the evidence with respect to the role of managers 
and the power of workers are ambiguous as in some studies both workers and 
managers were found to be opposed to restructuring while in others they were 
proven to be important positive factors in pursuit of reforms within enterprises 
(Pinto et al., 1993; Brada, 1998). 
The relationship between ownership and enterprise restructuring has 
been investigated in the context of differences between state and private owners 
and between different types of private owners. While both state and privately 
owned enterprises engaged in defensive restructuring, the evidence of strategic 
restructuring were more often associated with private ownership (Frydman et al., 
1997; Carlin et al., 2004; Domadenik et al., 2008). In general, private enterprises 
were found to be more productive and cost efficient, investing more in fixed 
assets, marketing and R&D, taking into account the fact that the two groups’s 
access to finance is very different (Charap and Zemplinerova, 1993; Dimova, 
2003; Robinson, 2004; Domadenik et al., 2008). With respect to different types of 
ownership, the most comprehensive restructuring took place in enterprises bought 
by managers or outside owners, particularly foreign owners (Frydman et al., 
1997; Djankov, 1999; Robinson, 2004). Foreign owners were able to inject new 
capital in the enterprise and in the majority of cases they brought know-how and 
foreign expertise. They also tended to increase the revenues of enterprise, 
increase its cost efficiency and labour productivity.   
In models of enterprise restructuring hard budget constraint is defined as 
an incentive for enterprises to improve their cost efficiency (Aghion et al., 1994; 
Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). However, a substantial body of evidence indicates 
that hard budget constraints have acted as impediment to strategic restructuring of 
enterprises by blocking their access to financial funds (Carlin et al., 1994; Brada, 
1998; Claessens, 2005). Studies undertaken on enterprises in various transition 
countries have reported a positive relationship between the ability of enterprise to 
access finance and the extent of its strategic restructuring measured by various 
indicators such as investment in fixed assets, R&D, training or marketing 
(Djankov, 1999; Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Domadenik et al., 2008). However, 
the findings for defensive restructuring have not been so unambiguous. Carlin et 
al. (2004) found on a sample of enterprise from 25 transition countries that the 
existence of soft budget constraint has a positive impact on defensive 
restructuring while Coricelli and Djankov (2001) argue that the existence of soft 
budget constraint impeded defensive restructuring of enterprises in Romania.  
With respect to product market competition, most studies have focused 
on the interactions between domestic and foreign enterprises. The starting 
position in most of these studies is that intensified competition motivates 
enterprises to change their product mix, search for new markets and improve the 
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design and quality of their products (Carlin et al., 1994). But it has also been 
argued that the presence of foreign competitors can have negative effect on 
domestic enterprises if the absorptive capacity of the latter, i.e. their ability to 
gain benefits through rivalry with foreign counterparts, is low (Sabirianova Peter 
et al., 2004). The empirical evidence on the impact of competition on enterprise 
restructuring has been ambiguous. On the one hand, there is evidence of positive 
impact of intensified competition on productivity of enterprises and their 
motivation to introduce new products (Dimova, 2003; Carlin et al., 2004). On the 
other hand, in some studies competition from foreign rivals was found to 
negatively influence restructuring of enterprises (Djankov, 1999; Angelucci et al., 
2002). These findings have been backed up by several studies on the spillover 
effects of FDI on domestic enterprises. The explanation for this relationship is 
that domestic enterprises benefit from FDI mainly through vertical linkages 
(ownership over domestic enterprises) while the horizontal effects of FDI 
(competition) have mainly been associated with the exit of domestic enterprises 
from the market (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Damijan and Majcen, 2000; 
Sabirianova Peter et al., 2004; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006). 
Finally, in addition to these main determinants of enterprise 
restructuring, some studies have included additional variables such as size or 
market orientation. Larger firms were found to create more revenues and have 
higher productivity while smaller ones were found to invest more (Coricelli and 
Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 2003; Carlin et al., 2004). Coricelli and Djankov (2001) 
also argue that firms oriented to export market tend to engage more in strategic 
restructuring. However, their finding is contradicted by Domadenik et al. (2008) 
who have found no statistically significant difference between the behaviour of 
enterprises which compete domestically and those that participate in international 
markets. The effect of market orientation is therefore ambiguous. 
 
4.3.  Methodological issues  
The modelling approach to enterprise restructuring in the early transition 
literature was based on the assumption that external environment motivates 
enterprises to change their behaviour in order to perform better or become more 
competitive (they were exogenous). However, in several studies authors have 
recognised that outcomes of restructuring may act also as its determinants 
suggesting that there is the problem of endogeneity (Carlin et al., 2004; 
Domadenik et al., 2008). In addition to this, several studies have also pointed to 
biases that may arise from the relationship between forms of restructuring and 
unobserved firm, industry and country specific characteristics (Zajc-Kejzar and 
Kumar, 2006; Commander and Svejnar, 2007). In the empirical literature, these 
problems have been treated with different techniques though the degree of 
attention paid to them has varied in different studies. 
The problem of endogeneity has been recognised in the context of the 
relationship between outcomes of restructuring such as productivity, revenues, 
etc. and the  independent variables such as innovation activities or employment 
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adjustment, access to finance, type of ownership, the quality of business 
environment, the extent of competition or other industry and country specific 
characteristics (Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 2003; Carlin et al., 2004; 
Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006; Commander and Svejnar, 2007; Masso and 
Vahter, 2007). These problems have been dealt with in two ways. On the one 
hand, authors of some studies have investigated the impact of potentially 
endogenous variables in lagged forms on the dependent variable which were 
measured in current period (Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 2003). On the 
other hand, there were studies that attempted to find suitable instruments for 
potentially endogenous variables on the basis of theoretical predictions and 
within limits of their datasets (Carlin et al., 2004; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006; 
Commander and Svejnar, 2007).  
The impact of business environment on restructuring of enterprises has 
been isolated in a straightforward manner through variables which control for 
industry, region and country specific effects (Frydman et al., 1997; Linz, 2000; 
Vehovec, 2003; Bakanova et al., 2006; Domadenik et al., 2008). However, this 
was not the case with unobserved firm-specific characteristics. When these 
effects were taken as time-invariant authors have either assumed that this 
individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables 
(Hoekman and Djankov, 2000) or they attempted to eliminate unobserved firm-
specific effects by estimating models in differenced form (Vehovec, 2003). 
Studies that assumed the sources of bias to be time-variant have specified models 
of enterprise restructuring mainly in two stages where the dependent variable in 
the first stage was specified in the form of a choice variable and the residuals 
from this stage were incorporated in the second stage equation to control for 
potential selection bias (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 
2006).  
A distinct approach to above problems has been developed in studies 
using a dynamic framework (Christev and Fitzroy, 2002; Vehovec, 2003; 
Domadenik et al., 2008; Kolesnikova, 2010). In general, these studies allow for 
individual unobserved heterogeneity of enterprises and, in that context, for the 
potential endogeneity between some of the explanatory variables and unobserved 
firm, industry and country specific characteristics. Furthermore, this approach 
allows authors to control for path dependency of enterprise restructuring as well 
as to distinguish between the short-run and long-run impacts of actions which 
enterprises take in terms of employment adjustment, investment in machinery, 
equipment and in R&D.  
 
4.4.  Shortcomings of the studies on enterprise restructuring in 
transition 
The review of the literature on enterprise restructuring in transition 
shows that there are several shortcomings in these studies and a number of gaps 
in the state of knowledge on the subject. Starting with the geographical coverage 
of current studies, most of the reviewed work is focused on the group of advanced 
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transition economies labelled as CEECs (Benacek et al., 1997; Frydman et al., 
1997; Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Lizal, 1999; Halpern and Korosi, 2001; 
Christev and Fitzroy, 2002; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 
2006; Masso and Vahter, 2007; Domadenik et al., 2008). Of other countries, only 
a few studies have paid some attention to Bulgaria and Romania (Coricelli and 
Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 2003) and to CIS countries (Djankov, 1999; Linz, 2000; 
Bakanova et al., 2006; Kolesnikova, 2010) while Vehovec (2003) investigated 
restructuring of enterprises in Croatia and Slovenia. Finally, Carlin et al. (2004) 
and Commander and Svejnar (2007) have brought together the data from several 
transition countries.  
The studies reviewed above have largely concentrated on the early 
period of transition, prior to 1997 (Benacek et al., 1997; Frydman et al., 1997; 
Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Lizal, 1999; Linz, 2000; Coricelli and Djankov, 
2001; Halpern and Korosi, 2001; Christev and Fitzroy, 2002) when the most 
important issue was whether enterprises will be able to survive in the new market 
oriented environment. Other studies mainly cover the period up to 2003 
(Djankov, 1999; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Dimova, 2003; Vehovec, 2003; 
Carlin et al., 2004; Masso and Vahter, 2007; Domadenik et al., 2008). The 
behaviour of enterprises in later years of transition when market institutions were 
developed and some of these countries joined the EU is largely unknown. In this 
context, another gap in reviewed literature relates to its time coverage.  As we can 
see, the research on enterprise restructuring in the less advanced transition 
economies is rather scarce and limited to shorter periods of time.  
There is also an evident lack of research which would relate forms of 
restructuring with its outcomes in terms of performance and particularly 
competitiveness. Models of enterprise behaviour in most studies analyse 
individual forms of restructuring against some of its determinants or evaluate 
enterprise performance on the basis of some of the same determinants. In both 
cases, the relationship between forms of restructuring and its outcome is 
implicitly assumed. Little is known about effects of restructuring on market share, 
export performance or other indicators of competitiveness of enterprises. Also, in 
these studies, the authors focus on either defensive or strategic forms of 
restructuring and to the best of our knowledge there is no study that brings 
together the two forms of defensive and strategic restructuring with their 
outcomes - whether in terms of performance or competitiveness.    
From the methodological standpoint, the existing literature suffers from 
an important limitation in that most studies fail to treat problems of either 
selection bias or simultaneity. There is a simultaneous and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between forms of restructuring and the outcomes of restructuring 
(improved competitiveness of firms, for example). These problems have been 
recognised at the theoretical level but, in the majority of empirical studies, have 
not been treated appropriately. In practice, most studies have used techniques 
which allowed them to control for either unobserved effects or the endogeneity. 
In relation to that, much of the existing work is undertaken within a static 
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framework and only few studies have acknowledged the path dependency of 
restructuring and placed this process in a dynamic context.  
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper attempted to broaden understanding of the process of 
enterprise restructuring in the transition period. The restructuring is a 
multidimensional process which takes place at macroeconomic, industry and 
microeconomic levels. Although notions of restructuring differ among these 
levels, together they form pieces of larger mechanism which can lead to 
improvements in the competitiveness of national economies in the long run. 
Enterprise restructuring lies at the heart of this mechanism while the restructuring 
processes at industry and economy-wide levels act as supporting processes which 
create the environment facilitating the restructuring of enterprises.  
Owing to the problems inherited from the socialist period, the survival of 
enterprises in transition economies was not possible without restructuring. By the 
advanced stage of transition, in the majority of countries, the core institutions 
needed for the functioning of a market economy were established and their 
economic structures have become similar to those in advanced market economies. 
In analysing enterprise responses to these changes we have identified two main 
patterns of firm behaviour and concluded that only those firms who engage in 
deep or strategic restructuring have been able to survive in the long run.  
The review of the current literature on enterprise restructuring identified 
many gaps in the present state of knowledge. It is evident that studies which 
relate competitiveness with restructuring while taking into account the dynamic 
nature of the two concepts, are generally scarce. Moreover, most of the existing 
studies estimate the effect of individual restructuring measures on firm 
performance and draw conclusions about the impact of restructuring through the 
relationship between its determinants and outcomes. Another potential problem 
has been noted is the inability of existing studies to control for problems of 
selectivity and simultaneity in models of restructuring. Finally, the majority of 
studies deal with behaviour of enterprises in early stages of transition and not the 
later and more mature phases of transition when the gap between many of these 
economies and mature market economies has been reduced. Furthermore, the 
present studies almost entirely focus on advanced transition economies, leaving 
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OBLICI I ODREDNICE RESTRUKTURIRANJA 





Položaj poduzeća, industrija i gospodarstava na tržištu ovisi o njihovim 
odgovorima na veliki broj inicijativa, tržišnih trendova, tehnoloških promjena, 
mjera ekonomske politike i institucionalnih reformi. Promjene u ponašanju koje 
poduzeća poduzimaju kako bi preuzela tržište svojih rivala obično se nazivaju 
restrukturiranjem. Razumijevanje restrukturiranja poduzeća važno je jer je 
sposobnost poduzeća da se natječu na tržištu bitna odrednica sposobnosti 
njihovih gospodarstava da rastu i pruže svojim građanima bolji standard 
življenja. Tijekom protekla dva desetljeća restrukturiranje je bilo bitno obilježje 
života poduzeća u zemljama Središnje i Istočne Europe. Institucionalne promjene 
u ovim zemljama zahtijevale su od poduzeća uvođenje promjena u ponašanju 
kako bi mogli opstati na tržištu. Imajući navedeno u vidu ovaj rad istražuje 
ciljeve i razloge restrukturiranja poduzeća u uvjetima tranzicije. Također, rad 
identificira glavne oblike restrukturiranja i analizira koji su činitelji utjecali na 
odluku poduzeća o provođenju određenog oblika restrukturiranja. Konačno, rad 
pruža osvrt na metodologiju korištenu u prethodnim analizama restrukturiranja 
poduzeća u tranziciji.  
Ključne riječi: restrukturiranje poduzeća, tranzicija, institucije, zemlje 
Središnje i Istočne Europe. 
JEL klasifikacija: D21, P31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
